In Search of Identity: The Contemporary Islamic Communities in Southeast Asia by Hasan, Noorhaidi
Volume 7. Number 3.2000
$TIIDHI$
INDONESIAN.TouRNAL FoR rsLAMrc sTUDTES
ISLAM IN INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY:
ASSESSING IMPACTS OF ISLAMIC RTVIVNIISIII DURING TUT SOTMRTO ERA
Azyumardi Azra
At-'AarcIyyAHAND BnSn SuuOn: IOTOTOGITS OF TRANSLATION
AND INTERPRETATION AMONG THT MUSI-IIIIS OF WEST JAVA
Benjamin G. Zimmer
Iru SennCH OF IDENTITY:






M. Quraish Shihab (IAIN lakarta)
Taufik Abdullnh (LIPI lakarta)
Nur A. Fadhil Lubis (IAIN Sumatrn Utara)
M.C. Ricklefs (Melbourne Uniuersity)
Martin aan Bruinessen (Utrecht Uniaersity)
John R. Bowen (Washington Uniaersity, St. Louis)
M. Atho Mudzhar (IAIN Yogynkarta)

















STUDIA ISLAMIKA (ISSN 0215-04giZl i, o journal published quarterly by the
Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM), IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jnkartn(STT DEPPEN No. 129/SK/DITIEN/PPG/STT/1976) and sponsored by the
Department of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia lt specializes in
Indonesian Islamic studies, and is intended to communicate original researches nnd
current issues on the subject. This journal warmly welcomes contributions from
scholars of related disciplines.
AII articles published do not necessarily represent the aiews of the journal, or' other '
institutions to which it is ffiIinted. They are solely the rtiews of the authors' The
articles contained in this journal haae been refereed by the Board of Editors'
SruDIA ISLAMIKA has been accredited by The Ministry of National Education,
Republic of Indonesia as an acndemic iournal.
Noorbaidi Hasan
In Search of Identity:
The Contemporary Islamic Communities
in Southeast Asia
/ L--J1 ..,s ;-"J-lt oul it- 3 (ciui/:ocie[) 3Jt 5--4t ,f tA\ tt:\ :b)v
;Jl ,_ilrJ';)l ot-4Yl .-:1i J!"1-11 oK r c) As t; U ;oy q+)l a?G 3 !1i-
.3-rlt a^:+t Ct. 3 iuJr j ^"1l iK u 1ri ,*s
,;r!r Lt---4 3 .,;ljbjil ot-4!1 .:;ti JF.I.JI oS r ;i 3r;lr ;f ,soJ
,;Jt ct-t-uJly 4-t*J1 a"IJ J- tf oXb ,C_At L-T v:* k- /+ Y_l
;i a--rU^ ;)t li 4*t^j*!1 o.-LJl if elj*" l:jl* 
";A 
,f*oi 
.f* a+ JI J=t
,ii ;,. +>t-)l c,\fr-11 Cr" .rrr2Jl S f 4 3LJl oL4!U cq,:Jr pi 4-to-Jr
,JJ--D\.i- J, d_r .+").-1t JtJt ;lt^-c.AAl a-qJl a"L + l;y:.J
f#; A A^ t&" 1-r.og c.-!-r*Jl or'*. ,-f e-/ ,:i +y-)l c'6)t.rJ-tf
L:s---4tr Gtrbi\r ot4!t .:ti qa-rJl -nfy*lt5;;' ''
Jy----- ar- ,-)+S .\r rtr\tt 5.-r.;:J !t+ ---+ g;jJl pt-Jl rtt)t U .^JJl
J,g ,tl ,:aJl .:,l-f/l t<, ;..ert Il c,t{ }t y;At U7 ;,s urKLt; k"-
lljJt)l oL--J!1 .;l! qa-rJ1 cr\{}t -r-^i cd.U: '-.-f.S..t/1 JJl ,J. *t"
**LJl )tlJ\ i-;i 4 & d .-16,1 a"rC-u a;rt lt ,rr;*:^-1r o6 r-
+y-l aly: c[^:.i! ,* iE f'!l 6i.A ;i ;.lu t41 .u,j{,Lr cs_-:lr s],c
; k:-) aLull etrlt il eUi ,\ro ;f J l,r(Jt L^!riGJr ,6*!t 1t+ia/ !+
.g-rlt g--4t r &rJ ,nL-!r &<jJ lte 3-;
c.,'U;lt jlJLjll ot-4)l .>li e;-tll crtf/l ;r b-r,c e.*Jl li"a JSV"S
cs-----a e-Jt tj,. tlyte dl c,t<+\J .L-)VS L*-*y-u! oL",Jt ;;n ),t1i 3
69 Studia IsLamika, Vol.7, No.3,2000
Noorbaidi Hrcan
",il a ,-1-" t---rL+ f .trtk gIl\D "t?tl, 6)\.11 i-cL+"J 1DA) "pUrll ,1:"
c-,l Jl" i-cL+y c(Bandung) 6;ylL "r.-ll ,l:" acL+; (Samarinda) l$JL--i
LJ Qazk:yaSejati) g\-z* 6;1 g^t^^adina; "Qrt tJ" J lifi4 "c/y-)l
ol3 /t e.lf pk*|,>";,* ,Vsl ita'-" gU: ,J e:jt ot5, .uf
a.4i",)\-)r *JtJr L(1: JJI y;At ,p; d +,}-Xt
,\: z{ r-.-i\i (YJi :ct---,t-).e ;*"5 ;:f nl crtSr*JJ ,ti }o)lt .f_t
*ilt .-Li ar.aj.=/)L-)l .1rfr a'L+y J"-ll ,l:; oirl ql-r-a a-cL+y ptirlr
(8 s)s J)W euj J*ia.,"J .q-qJly arrL,,-i!I1 ::tL->yl ,fdl J,e
..t---ir.l li* ,rI" +)^t).;1-LJl ,V) J-i u" eks t^.r-hs;.1-rJl elrll
l-+:t lr,y lrV Cy-r)l bL*+;"*Jt l.i1 .uJ-<U,rb elUll g*f t:&
'5""a--r: l-l-;:" 
,r")\-l e* 4-F J*i .f -r-^l* c^;K; 9t*- a"{;1
,!-;----a d!-i JJll ae;J\.ij" 4,b U Uy-tJ t,tUJl c.,!.ra o*ly,-ri &t--
.al;-rJt ;tbL C. I.<LJ 5\ tar" o1+-
(L-AYJi .a -La t-t4;.r),t +)L-)1 e\Slt g1l; a-lr: J); ,y tssl
\t---t ,abt.;-!t ,_/)L-)l eJ., O;t,,Ie io^t-"tt ;24 al1v,>Slt t6
.a-rKLt tlj Jsrt dr, !4 {S} i.r.- p>,l.-!l il4l sle f4'f e L* ot4!1
r.L-:.;l ,--+ +-l! ,t:y oirl arl-ra arL+y 1G;!l ;t, c^I.r (JJJi Jo;-l\os
,Jt-+ Aj\A'4:"bi L!?dl aciJt o6/l i c-J.b L6tUJ .Jtjll ,_j")'t-)l C..+1
;--qJl c,S r oK /t Jy- 
"r J{ ji J.^:Jt A } ,Q':Jti; .s.rJt
.a"r(Jt ; k) l:; 6juJl
J---J, +)L-)l '>6 /t J; t*,:i g-r-lt erAt jJbr o+-s ,r &s
.L-IVS L.-*y;r:! t+-i: &s,l/:Jl U-l .:1a ;.rlt3.:4t .:,tfr.- th &
tXJ C- L--at-t-aS 
"an 
d 
.,,!jbj!l ol-4!1 el: a."y-il et{ }l 41
JFI--ll 
"z'e 
)'U. 1 ,-f ^1."5 a:")\-!l otS ltl.C-:41 d aL,a:Jl c-,$Jt
3 Jt;;)tJ rrl;_, dr" lrii Jl ajt,)! ,Ll>1 .t 3{LlJe ;.U:Jl r+\.,\ .r}
c,t-{}t a/ t^,o.J jurJt .:! pr S o*l"Jl; ift"}!l t1*;ll;;uJt
6r-l r, +)L-)r c,K/r .u ;i 
"rJ.l 
j^.i .*lf SIJi 
.,Ic tV1 .gaat1 g;
.+t;'f))\ th C:ltr*>lJ C-:4! JLJ
Studu klanika, Vol. 7, No. 3,2000
ln Searcb of ldntity 71
ike other parts of the Muslim world at the end of the twen-
tieth century, Southeast Asia is witnessing a proliferation
of contemp orary Islamic movements-religious communi-
ties that are highly assertive in their efforts to implement various
"Islamic visions" in educational, social, economic and political
arenas. Particular forms of Islam, such as Sufism, puritanism and
(neo)fundamentalism, are apparently being absorbed into such
movements. There is a strong desire to imitate and revive the
'Golden Age of Islam', which is perceived to be the pure, ideal
Islam, upon which contemp orary life should be based. On the
other hand, through "re-Islamization", the movements offer a new
model of .modern society altogether, and a critique of the "'West-
ern" way of life. To some extent, they convey a desire to advance
values distinctly different from 'il/estern models and to counrer
what is perceived as rampant 'Westernization in traditional societ-
ies. It is interesting, however, that the movements' are concerned
with expanding economic development, adopting high technol-
ogy, and using new media as a means to communicate their vi-
sions and messages.
The advent of contemp orary Islamic inovemenrs cannot be dis-
associated from the processes of modernization and globalization
that have brought about rapid social change. The spread of lit-
eracy and higher education, the development of communication
media, urbanization, as well as national political integration, un-
doubtedly have played a crucial role in this change,i particularly
in the production of large urban populations and new middle
classes. In the process of modernization, which is marked ro some
extent by secularization, some segments of Muslim societies have
inevitably been marginalized. They have been afforded little sta-
tus or power, and have often been excluded {rom modern devel-
opment processes. There has been little opportunity for them to
participate in the political spheres of many narion-srares. Certain
political orders have even been inclined to develop public policies
against the expression of Muslim politics. Islamic movemenrs rhar
have reacted to such occurrences have further been accelerated by
the vagaries of globalization, which drives people to resenr rhe
loss of control over their lives, over their societies, over their states,
and above all over their fate of the Earth.2 In light of rhese obser-
vations then, a hypothesis can be put forward that conremporary
Islamic movements represent projects that offer not only prorec-
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tion from insecurity, disintegration, and tough comPetition ln
capitalist-urban environments, but also a unique response and con-
tribution to the processes of modernization and globaliz tion.
Elaborating on'Weber's theory of modernization, which views
the tendencies toward different types of rationalization at work
with their own autonomous principles, Jiirgen Habermas proposes
a theory that highlights the significance of civil society within the
process of modernization. According to him, civil society repre-
sents a novel reality and a type of freedom that is different from
the past. It embodies subjective and principled freedom, which
emphasizes the rational pursuit of self-interest, the equal right to
participate in political decision-making, and ethical autonomy and
self.-realization. This principle arises from the struggle of civil so-
ciety in encouraging the rise of the public sphere, a realm of social
life, which allows private individuals to freely exPress and pub-
lish their opinions concerning various matters of general interest.
Vithin this realm, the issues bearing on the exercise of political
power by the state can be discussed openly alongside the stan-
dards of rational and critical debate.3 Of central importance in
this notion is the existence of a vibrant public sphere, which al-
lows different voices to be heard in the context of egalitarian com-
munication.
'$ilhen the spaces for participation in the public sphere are
clogged by the dominance of a state hegemony,' resistance from
within civil society to regain those spaces appears to be inescap-
able. This resistance may take manifold forms, one of which is a
religious movement. Contemporary Islamic movements can thus
be conceived of as a site of resistance within civil society, which
attempts to make marginahzed voices heard in public life. Since
hegemony is maintained through discourse,5 contemporary Islamic
movements often attempt to produce discourses that are different
from that produced by the state, by, among others methods, criti-
cizing the national-secular expressions of politics and advocating
the formation of an Islamic state. Implicit in this argument is the
idea that contemporary Islamic movements have generated a
counter-hegemonic discourse, which is quite possibly shaping the
foundations of civil society in many countries.
The public sphere is highly necessary particularly in the con-
text of the legitimation crises facing many contemPorary societies
and modern institutions that have failed to ensure economic
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growth and political stability.6 Such crises have ironically been
more articulated when the intellectuality and welfare of people at
large have increased significantly. According to Habermas, the
phenomenon of new social movements is related to this legitima-
tion crisis. They are reactions against the internal colonization of
the life-world and the penetration of economic and administra-
tive rationality into everyday life produced by states in their at-
tempt to avoid such crises. As a reaction, the new social move-
ments provide avenues for the development of new values and
identities, as well as novel interpretations of social life, and repre-
sent the main vehicles by which communicative rationality can
be brought into public life. Thus, the new social movements are
as much struggling to define their relationship to the emergence
of new forms of instrumental and communicative knowledge as
they are responding to economic and social changes.T
One important factor that frequently results in a legitimation
crisis is the process of globalization, a term used to refer to the
creation and intensification of worldwide social relations that have
blurred the existing geographical, social, and political boundaries,
where a growing interdependence on a global whole and cross-
cultural intervention are inescapable.s 'When analyzing contem-
porary religious movements in the Muslim world in connection
with the process of. globalization, Manuel Castells argues that the
advent of contemporary Islamic movements belongs to the conse-
quences of globalization. His argument is that, when, within the
global constellation, modern nation-states are incapable of inte-
grating urban masses through economic welfare, and the Muslim
clergy through official sanction of their religious power, a reac-
tion would inevitably appears against the existing order. This re-
sistance may take the form of a call to return back to a prrmary
identity, constructed by working on "traditional materials in the
formation of a new godly, communal world, where deprived masses
and disaffected intellectuals may reconstruct meaning in a global
alternative to the exclusionary global order".e
In the search for this primary identity, the strong emphasis of
Islam on communal life and social responsibility is particularly
appealing.l0 \(/ithin communal life, contemporary Islamic move-
ments find a new {orce whereby they can express their notions,
visions and certainly empower themselves. However, the
communality pattern does not necessarily mean anti-modernity.
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Although Bryan \Tilson associates the disappearance of the com-
munal system with modernity, he recognizes that modern societ-
ies often still need the language of community because there ap-
pears to be no other languages in which loyalties and goodwill
can be established.ll The communal system functions to establish
and maintain the loyalties of members of a movement working
toward a common goal. It is not difficult to imagine that under
the umbrella of communality, a network of trust relationships
can easily be established. The network might develop into a form
of "social capital", which facilitates "coordination and coopera-
tion for mutual benefit".12
\Tithin this context, Sufism provides not only spirirual discourse
but also the basis of communal life in some contemporary Islamic
movements. However, it is not in the sense of the traditional Sufi
orders, which emphasize the search for the ultimate goal of life as
a result of the tension with the world, nor inward-looking mys-
tics whose goals are geared towards achieving the highest stage of
the vertical man-God relationship. Rather, it is a type of creative
synthesis of the existing world order, which lies mainly in its ten-
dencies to promote the esoteric dimension of Islam, as well as its
side that shows respect for pluralism and tolerance. The elements
of Sufism that have been adopted by certain contemporary Islamic
movements at times have promoted a synergy that encourages the
development of civil society.
The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the con-
tribution of contemporary Islamic movements to the rise of the public
sphere in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia.
Implicit in this idea of "contribution" is the empowerment of Mus-
lims as once disenfranchised groups within the context of the de-
velopment of civil society. This analysis includes consideration of
the following movements: The most phenomenal "Darul Arqam",
a Kuala Lumpur-based movement that was banned by the South-
east Asian authorities in mid 1994. Vith its own characteristics,
"JIM (Malaysian Reformation Community)" is also interesting to
study within the context of the political transformation of Malay-
sia. In the case of Indonesia, we encounter such contemporary
movements as "Jamaah Hidayatullah" and "Darut Tauhid", two
movements that exhibit a strong desire to empov/er Muslims in
the social and economic realms. There is also a religious commu-
nity known as "Jamaah Al-Turath al-Islami", that tends to with-
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draw from the public sphere, yet maintains some hope to play a
role in the political arena at some point. '$ilith their prominent
characteristics as urban-elite Islamic groups, "Paramadina" and
"Tazkiya Sejati", two religious learning centers led by two promi-
nent Indonesian Muslim thinkers, Nurcholish Madjid and
Jalaluddin Rakhmat respectively, are also to be included into this
paper. Notwithstanding their great diversity, these movements
constitute a site of resistance within civil society that attempts to
give voice to the general interests of the marginalized within the
constellation of modernizatton and globalization.It is recognized
that in promoting something of a uniform discourse on Islam that
advances an alternative to the existing world order, a certain
amount of anxiety and uncertainty is generated.
The Political and Social Background
Indonesia
Contemporary Islamic movements in Southeast Asia seem to
have evolved in correlation with the political and social changes
arising from the acceleration of development programs conducted
by the governments within the area under discussion. In the case
of Indonesia, for instance, the movements began to emerge when
the New Order, driven by Soeharto, came to power after bring-
ing Soekarno down tn L966. Being aware that Soekarno's failure
might have been caused by his focus on ideological and political
affairs that resulted in never-ending tension between religion and
the state, Soeharto decided to go focus on a strategy of develop-
ment and moderntzation. Consequently, religious expressions were
margrnalized in the political process, in spite of the considerable
role that was played by Muslims in bringing the New Order into
existence. The quest for the revitahzation of Muslim politics was
rejected by Soeharto, under the shadows of his two primary ad-
visers, Ali Moertopo and Soejono Hoemardani. Rather, a policy
of, borrowing Martin van Bruinessen's term, "the regimentation
of political Islam"li was advanced. Masyumi, the Muslim party
that had placed second in the 1955 general election, did not obtain
a green light to be resuscitated. Rather, as a result of the regime's
intervention in the party's internal affairs,la Parmusi, a new party
designed by Soeharto to accommodate Muslim modernists minus
the leadership of former Masyumi figures, failed to draw votes in
the L97L general election. The Nahdhatul (Jlama (NU), Persatuan
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Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti) Persatuan Sarekat Islam Indonesla (PSSI),
other Muslim parties, were likewise inef{ective in challenging the
new political machine created by Soeharto's regime, Golongan
Karya (Golkar), which gained 62.8 o/o of votes in that election. In
short, the politicai struggle through Islamic-labeled parties in the
1.971 general election ended with failure.15
After the 1,971election, the regimentation of political Islam
was continued by the 'parties {usion' policy. All Muslim parties
were fused into the United Development Party (PPP), as the na-
tionaiist and Christian parties were fused into the Indonesian
Democratic Party (PDD. However, with various forms of inter-
vention into the parties' internal affairs, the regime never allowed
these two parties to be powerful or to challenge Golkar. Both
Darties suffered various failures from one election to the next.
b.rring that time, any challenge to the deveiopment doctrine di-
rected by the government could easily be labeled either 'right ex-
treme' or 'left extreme'. The Subversive Act, inherited from
Soekarno, was used as a powerful weapon to suppress challenges
to the regime.
The peak of the regimentation of political Islam occurred when
the New Order government forced all mass organizations and po-
litical parties to accept 'Pancasila' 
- 
the five principles that con-
stiture the ideology of the state-as sole basis for their charters.
For this task, the government legislated the Mass Organization
and PoliticalParty Act of 1985.16 In reaction to this policy' NU,
the largest Muslim-traditionalist organization, quickly declared its
acceptance of Pancasila, while Muhammadiyah, a Muslim-mod-
ernist umbrella, took some time before doing the same.
During the period discussed above, various uprisings and riots
in the name of Islam occurred. 'We note, for instance, the rush of
a group of young people led by Abdul Qadir Djaelani, who named
themselves "Pola Perjuangan Revolusioner Islam" (The Pattern of
Revolutionary Islamic Struggle) to the People Consultative
Council's assembly in March I978.Two years earlier,the Komando
Jibad (Jrhad Command) actions led by H. Ismail Pranoto erupted'
which were not suppressed until 1981. In 1981 a group of people
loyal to Imran M. Zein carried out a series o{ attacks on police
stations and other governmental services. The peak of these at-
racks was the hijacking of a Garuda Indonesia airplane on 28 March
1981. Other violence took place in 1'984 in Tanjung Priok' north
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Jakarta, when hundreds of people, who demanded the liberation
four of their colleagues, under the command of Amir Biki, were
shot by military troops. This tragedy cost dozens of lives.li Al-
though religion-colored rebellions decreased after the Tanjung
Priok massacre, various other tragedies including inter-ethnic ri-
ots and the burning of churches continued to break out through-
out Soeharto's presiden cy, many of which contributed to his down-
fall in May 1,998.
Indonesian Muslims, who found few opportunities to express
themselves in the political arena under the Soeharto's regime,
turned their interests toward the economic and educational
spheres. This was favored by the goyernment's policy to acceler-
ate the process of development and modernization, which was
initiated in 1,969 with the Pelita (Pembangunan Lima Tahun),Five-
year planned development program. The participation of Mus-
lims in higher education significantly increased at that time in Iine
with the rapid migration of rural masses that sought new lives in
Indonesia's big cities. More and more people who came from a
santri (Islamic student) background enrolled in modern schools
and universities resulting in an intellectual boom for Muslims,
which, as described by Nurcholish Madjid,18 encouraged the
growth of new Muslim middle class. At the same time, this intel-
lectual boom resulted in the acceleration of, in Aswab Mahasin's
term, the embourgeoisement process f.or santri, also known as
priyayinization.le This phenomenon facilitated the mobility of
santri, horizontally and vertically, marked by the spread of santri
into various sectors of activities and governmental services, as well
as modern business structures, which brought about the fading of
the tri-chotomy variants of Javanese culture described by Clifford
Geertz.2a
By the end of the 1980s, the tension that had characterized Is-
lam-state relations began to disappear. This can be seen from the
tendency of Soeharto's regime to accommodate the interests of
the Muslim middle class, though this accommodation was viewed
by some scholars as a strategy by Soeharto to consolidate support
and to seek new pillars for the continuation of his presidency.
This tendency began to be articulated in the 1990s, as the phe-
nomenon of Soeharto's santrinization came to the fore. At the
beginning of 1990s he performed the hajj pllgrimage and began
adopting Islamic symbols. ICMI (Association of Indonesian Mus-
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lim Intellectuals), an org r^ization comprised of many government
bureaucrats, was brought into being, and the ruling party, Golkar,
began to align its cloak with Islam as more and more Muslim in-
tellectuals were absorbed into its body.
Malaysia
There are many similarities between Indonesia and Malaysia in
terms of the relationship between Islam and the state. Malaysia's rela-
tionship has been marked particularly by the dominance of the secu-
lar-nationalist ruling parry, UMNO (United Malay National Orga-
nization),vis-)-vis Muslim powers in the arena of political life. UMNO
was the single most powerful political force in the nationalist move-
ment, and has ruled an independent Malaysia since statehood was
consolidated. National leaders coming from UMNO in their capac-
ity as state officials effectively linked the opposition challenge as a
threat to Malaysia's survival. Up until recently, the sole voice of Is-
lamic dissent against the liberal-secular orientation of the national
government was represented by PAS, which, nonetheless, was unable
to counter the vast political resources employed by the ruling elite.
In 1969, a ractal riot erupted that engulfed the capital city of
Kuala Lumpur for four days. Hundreds of people died and several
thousand were made homeless. The immediate cause of the riots
was the collision between the 'victory' demonstration held by
newly elected non-Malay opposition candidates, and counter-dem-
onstrations organized by pro-government Malay leaders. This riot
led the Malaysian government to realize that it had to accelerate
economic growth for the Malays population in the face of largely
Chinese capitalist economic dominance. The New Economic
Policy (NEP), which created favorable economic opportunities
for Malays, was launchedin t971. in order to limit the Chinese in
their dominance of the economy. The government also encour-
aged Malay youth to attend universities both at home and abroad
through various preferential policies. At home, new universities
were opened that enforced privileged quotas for Malays. Efforts
were made to ensure that more Malay students enrolled in science
and engineering programs that were hitherto dominated by non-
Malays. Scholarships were given to bright Malay students to pur-
sue their studies abroad,21 Although not all Malays succeeded in
acquiring access to the benefits of these policies, many have ben-
efited from them. As a result. the Malav Muslim middle class, con-
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stituting a fast-growing new class of bureaucrats, businesspersons)
academics, legal practitioners, doctors, engineers, and other pro-
fessionals has increased significantly.22
It is worth noting that the growth of the Muslim middle class
in Malaysia is also associated with the increase of the governmenr's
willingness, particularly under Mahathir Mohamad's leadership,
to demonstrate its support for Islam. It must be noted, however,
that there has been a tendency to accommodate Islamic symbols
and rituals, rather than the expression of political Islam. Such ac-
commodation has included the building of mosques, rhe upgrad-
ing of international Quran recitation conrests, daily broadcast of
azAn over radio and television, and a high public profile adopted
by UMNO leaders in Islamic activities and festivals. In the 1990s,
the government further demonstrated its commitment to Islam
by introducing various explicitly 'Islamic' policies. It sponsored
such projects as the Islamic banking and financial system, the Is-
lamic universities and colleges, and the Islamic administrative sys-
tem.23
Some observers view these Muslim-oriented policies merely as
the government's attempt to maintain its legitimacy and to pre-
vent substantial losses of Malay votes by default to PAS.2a \Tithin
this framework as well, we must understand the co-optation of
Anwar Ibrahim, former leader of ABIM, into the ruling party of
UMNO 
-a situation which ended tragically when Mahathir hadAnwar arrested in 1999 on highly questionable charges related to
an alleged sex scandal. The ambiguity of the government's sup-
port for Islam had been demonstrated previously through several
of the Mahathir's political moves. The government has regularly
threatened politically active groups with the controversial Inter-
nal Security Act (Akta Keselamatan Negara)and the Misuse of Re-
ligions Btll (Akta Salah Ugama), and has frequently equated Islamic
commitment with extremism and PAS.25 These acts have restricted
the sphere of Muslim political expression, and consequently con-
tributed to the emergence of new Islamic movemenrs in Malaysia.
Darul Arqam
The history of Darul Arqam began with the initiative of Ashari
Muhammad, an Islamic religious teacher, to establish a prayer
group (kelompok pengajian) in a residence known as "rhe \7hite
House" in a Kuala Lumpur suburb in 1968. Before establishing
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Darul Arqam, this figure had joined the Islamic partf t PAS, but
resigned in the mid-1960s. The initial intention of this group was
to learn, understand, and be convinced of the religious obliga-
tions of Islam, which involves the fields of theology, Islamic law,
and mysticism.26 Under the leadership of Ashari Muhammad' the
prayer group evolved into a phenomenal Islamic movement.
Darul Arqam's emphasis on Sufism was remarkable. Members
of the movement were enthusiastic about Aurad Mubamrnadiyah,
the Mohammedan invocations, allegedly given in a vision, from
the Prophet Muhammad to the founder of the Muhammadiyah
order, Shaikh Muhammad bin 'AbdullAh Suhaimi. These invoca-
tions were learned by Ashari Muharnmad from Lebai Ibrahim, a
disciple of the founder. Inspired by the Aurad Muhammadiyah,
Ashari Muhammad molded atype of mystical, cult-like approach,
which served as a spiritual guide for Darul Arqam's members. In
1986 he proclaimed that Shaikh MuYammad bin 'AbdullAh
Suhaimi, who died in !925, is not dead, but isin ghA'ibalr, seclu-
sion, and will reappear as mabdi, a messiah.2T
At the beginning, Ashari Muhammad's call was not greeted
with enthusiasm by Malay Muslims. Only a small group comprised
of ten young disciples led directly by Ashari Muhammad dedi-
cated their lives to forming the first Darul Arqam community based
in the \(hite House. These early adherents were mostly rural mi-
grants engaged in lower middle-class occupations. As a Prayer
group, members' activities were limited to a series of lectures, re-
ligious chanting, remembrance of God, melodic readings of epi-
sodes from Prophet Muhammad's life, night vigil, and informal
visitations. They were also taught to adhere steadfastly to the
"Prophet's lifestyle", even to the extent of imitating his clothes
and eating practices. For instance, the male followers donned gray
or dark Arab-style shirts and turbans, and kept thin mustaches
and bold beards, while the female followers wore long black dresses
and covered their face with veils leaving only the eyes visible.
After two years of a low-profile existence, Ashari Muhammad at-
tempted to broaden his audience by organizing public lectures in
such venues as mosques, schools, offices, and institutes of higher
learning, as well as accommodating personal invitations.28
The name Darul Arqam was introduced in 1'97I t'o replace the
name, the \flhite House Group. They believed that the new name
reflected the dedication of one of the Prophet's companions, Al-
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Arqlm ibn al-ArqAm, who used his house as a meeting place and
an Islamic propagation center for early Muslims in Mecca.2e IJn-
der the new name, the movement started to expand beyond the
restricted circle of the leader's personal friends and neighbors and
began to attract hundreds of students and rising middle class pro-
fessionals and technocrats.
Ashari Muhammad and his followers established the first model
Islamic village in Sungai Penchala, a remote area around twenty
kilometers from Kuala Lumpur in 1,973. Designed to be the
organization's administrative center, as well as a self-contained
social, religious and cultural entity, the community maintained a
school, shops, audio-visual and communication facilities, work-
shops, a bookstore, and a health clinic. The village was intended
to function as a prototype of an Islamic community, within which
Islam was claimed to be practiced in a proPer manner.
From its headquarters in this Islamic village, Darul Arqam ex-
panded its activities.In 1.975, it set up the Al-Arqam Foundation,
which organized schools that offered an integrated curriculum dif-
ferent from rhat oI government-sponsored secular and religious
schools. It was also concerned with da'raab activities via the mass
media and published the Al Arqam newspaper as its primary means
of extending its influence. The organization was also involved in
providing medical services and opened its first Medical Center in
1,978. By the end of the 1.97As, nearly the whole country had heard
of Darul Arqam, as branches and villages were subsequently
founded farther outside of its birthplace in Kuala Lumpur. Eco-
nomic expansion was pursued, mainly in the food industry, and
managed under the so-calle d '(Jmmalt Serztice' not far from Kuala
Lumpur.3o Its expansion peaked in 1993 when it pronounced its
Year of Economic Development. At that time, Darul Arqam con-
trolled 417 economic enterprises-mostly managed and staffed by
Darul Arqam members themselves throughout the production,
distribution and retailing stages.rl In order to manage this type of
conglomerate, Darul Arqam established the Al-Arqam Group of
Companies (AGC), which extended itself over twenty-two fields
inciuding administration and management, food and beverages,
medical and health services, and high-technology businesses.12
The phenomenal success of Darul Arqam in Malaysia opened
the way to transnational growth. The decades of the 1980s and
1990s was marked by massive expansion abroad.3r Darul Arqam's
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international branches grew rapidly thanks to Malaysian students
abroad, particularly in Britain, the USA, New Zealand, France,
and Australia. Meanwhile, in neighboring countries such as
Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, and Thailand, Darul
Arqam began more aggressively establishing its activities. The in-
ternational drive took a new turn in 1988 when Ashari Muhammad
lived abroad on a more or less permanent basis. The leader claimed
that his extensive travel was an attempt to demonstrate the role of
Islam as a global religion, not only for Malays but also for the
whole mankind.3a
In 1992, Ashari Muhammad proclaimed that the era of Islamic
resurgence had come. For him; Darul Arqam was struggling to
fulfill the promises according to the'schedule of God'that the
glory of Islam would be revived for Muslims of the fifteenth cen-
tury of the Islamic Hijrah calendar. He predicted a great Islamic
revival, starting from Southeast Asia, extending to Khurasan 
-an
ancient region in the old map of Islam and the backbone of this
revival- and ending in Mecca, where a messiah, the Imam Mahdi,
would be proclaimed.35
Darul Arqam was introduced to Indonesia by Ir. Amal Arifin,
who joined the movement when he was studying agriculture at La
Trobe University, Australia in the mid 1980s. The movement grew
rapidly from Jakarta to Medan, Aceh, Pekan Baru, Padang,
Bandung, Bogor, Tasikmalaya, Surabaya, and Malang. Darul
Arqam's ideas were mostly disseminated through universities and
succeeded to attract a considerable number of students and lectur-
ers who mostly came from technical backgrounds. The fame of
the movement increased when Dr. Ing. Abdurrahman Riesdam
Effendi, and his wife, Dr. Ing. Gina Puspita, who had earned doc-
toral degrees in France in aircraft engineering and aeronautics re-
spectively, joined Darul Arqam.36In order to organize the move-
ment, an emirate system was established, following the center in
Malaysia. There was an Indonesian emirate council, which con-
sisted of regional emirs and a national emir. All emirs, the major-
ity of whom were engineers, were appointed by Ashari Muhammad
based on the suggestions of the emirate council. Despite being in-
troduced to Indonesia by Amal Arifin, the key person in the In-
donesian Darul Arqam leadership was Abdurrahman Riesdam
Effendi. He was the only leader who had the authority to receive
the oath of members, and Ashari Muhammad legitimized his au-
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Tempo, a weekly Indonesian magazine, reported the existence
of Darul Arqam's communities in Jakarta. As in its birthplace in
Kuala Lumpur, the existence of the Darul Arqam in Jakarta was
remarkable. In a Darul Arqam center near lJniversity of Indone-
sia, there was a Sayyidatina Siti Khadijah caf6, a female salon, a
bookstore, and a cassette and video shop. There was also a graphic
design room that served computer-related needs. In another branch,
the Darul Arqam had a soy sauce factory and cassette record in-
dustry.38
In 1.994, the Malaysian government, followed by Indonesian
political authorities, officially banned the entire Darul Arqam sect.
In fact, the Malaysian government had begun its campaign against
the Darul Arqam in 1986 after unearthing allegedly deviant prac-
tices. The Aurad Muhammadiyah, the guidebook of Darul Arqam's
members, and certain practices associated with it, as well as Darul
Arqam's position with respect to Imam Mahdi constituted the
center of the terrible dispute. Since then, the campaigns against
Darul Arqam were expanded by involving state institutions, mass
media, and mass-religious organizations. Based on a politicized
allegation that the Darul Arqam had formed a 313-man 'suicide
army' based in Bangkok with designs to take over power in Ma-
laysia through militant means, the Malaysian government finally
found adequate reason rc finalize the Darul Arqam's affair.se The
Malaysian government sought cooperation from neighboring gov-
ernments to help suppress Darul Arqam. The request for coopera-
tion was welcomed by the Indonesian authorities. A number of
fatruas were issued proclaiming the sect's teachings as deviant. In
many provinces of the country, it was suggested that the Head of
the Provincial Office ban the organization. Finally, the national
Indonesian Ulama council declared Darul Arqam to be deviant
and proposed that the Attorney General bans it. a0
The banning of Darul Arqam, however, did not bring the story
of this movement to an end. Tn 1996 former members of Darul
Arqam in Indonesia established "Hawariyun", which is in many
respects not other than the continuation of the banned Darul
Arqam. They identify this transformation with the migration of
the Prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina.
For them, the banning of Darul Arqam was necessary, as was the
migration of the Prophet Muhammad to Medina. They believe
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that the mission of the "moral call", as that of the Prophet
Muhammad in Mecca, had been fulfilled by Darul Arqam, but the
mission needs to be continued. The task of Hawariyun then is to
implement the moral call in real life, as was carried out by the
Prophet Muhammad in Medina.
This movement believes that Muslims should rely on three Is-
lamic strengths, which comprise iman (belief , ukhuraruair (broth-
erhood), and kesefabaman (uniformity). However, they argue that
these three strengths do not make sense unless they are upheld by
the main subsidiary strength, the economy. They claim that by
Islamizing the economl, the household, society and state will be
automatically Islamized. In other words, the victory of Islam will
be won by reviving the economy within an Islamic paradigm.ot
Differing from its predecessor, the members of Hawariyun are
not interested in talking about politics, state or the like. Instead,
they are extremely concerned with what they cali the Islamic
economy and aim to present how this new model of economy
works in competition with other economic systems. They believe
that the essence of economy in Islam is to realize that all assets
and equipment utilized in the economic iield belong to Allah.
Muslims, they argue, simply carry out economic activities in or-
der to strengthen their faith and to implant the feeling of servi-
tude towards Allah. Through economy, Muslims can gain eternal
victorl, by becoming truly abiding and God-fearing servants. They
believe that although they may lose commercially, in the sight of
Allah, they will not. Instead, Allah will reward them generously
in the F{ereafter.
Hawariyun has various entrepreneurial divisions, which com-
prise the Madinah Al-Anshar Group, which manages such busi-
nesses as training and education. healthcare, construction, agri-
culture, and welfare; Qatrunnada Group, which is concerned with
culture, information, publication, and tourism; Technology Cen-
ter, which develops human resources development and training,
information technology, engineering and machinery maintenance'
and engineering consultant; and Suq al-Anshar, which advances
general trading, restaurant operations, and manufacturing.a2
By developing their economic strength' Hawariyun believes
that the East, namely Southeast Asia, vrill be the pioneer of the
revival of Islam. For Hawariyun, this is the definite promise o{
God, and will necessarily happen. \7hen the revival is approach-
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ing reality, they believe that Asia's economy will be united to
become a giant power.4r Based on this belief, Hawariyun has es-
tablished economic cooperation with its Malaysian counterPart'
"Rufaqa", which was established in 1997, whose profile is not much
different from Hawa riyun. Rufaqa primarily produces herbal prod-
ucts, food and audiocassettes, and manages retail and health ser-
vice.aa This cooperation generated an international company'
Zumala'Group, which manages export-imPort' Under this joint-
venture umbrella, the former members of the Darul Arqam enun-
ciated the year 2003 as the beginning of the Malay economic em-
pire, which they believe, will be the backbone of the Islamic re-
vlval.
Jamaah [slah Malaysia (flM)
JIM is an Islamic movement founded in 1991' by former activ-
ists of IRC, the Islamic Representative Council, an organization
established in I975 by Malaysian students enrolled in technical
courses in Britain. Inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood andJamaat
al-Islami, the IRC advocated Islam as the sole possessor of the true
path to a complete way of life. As its ideas were sPread through
the formation of small secret cells among students,o5 the IRC
emerged as a radical movement that was active particularly through
clandestine operations. Being critical of the goYernment and adopt-
ing a confrontational approach, the IRC became a dynamic Is-
lamic pressure group that was anti-establishment.a6
In line with changes in Malaysian politics, IRC changed its name
to JIM (]amaah Islah Malaysia) claiming itself as an organization
for Islamic reformation and peace, and carryine the theme of "con-
structing society together with Islam".JIM believes that its pres-
ence can contribute to both Islam and the development of soci-
ety. Specifically the organization aims to provide suPport for the
realization of Islamic goals and aspirations, which is accompanied
by conducting da'ualt, or missionary activities, at all levels of so-
ciety. JIM also believes that the concept of unity based on the
principle of Islamic brotherhood and universal values is to be high-
lighted in order to form a progressive and dynamic Muslim soci-
The movement's change of direction {rom its precursor and its
new approach makes JIM appear more moderate and emphasizing
of homeostasis in accordance with Malavsian politics. This is un-
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derstandable since, as JIM admits, a change of thinking had been
occurring in the administration of the country evidenced by the
introduction of Islamic politico-cultural conceprs. Thus, up unril
recently, it perceived the direction being pursued by the Malay-
sian State as positive, constructive and encouraging. It argues that
as long as Malaysia is being led and administrated by those who
are inclined to support Islam, Islamic values will automatically be
internalized in society. Consequently, the question of establish-
ing an Islamic state has ceased to be important.48
In order to accomplish its aims, Jllvf adopts and emphasizes the
concept of. tarbiah,Islamic education, which takes the form of in-
tensive wsrab units, night vigils, leadership training sessions, gather-
ings, visitations, congregational excursions, outdoor camps, and physi
cal fitness programs. Activities such as human resources development
and management initiatives, which focus on optimizing manpower
and pin-pointing motivational factors, are also introduced into JIM's
programs. In the educational field, JIM operates a number of kinder-
gartens, primary and secondary schools, and an institute of higher
education, where Islamic elements are combined with the Minisrry
of Education's curriculum. Its course materials are commonly selected
with the goal of instilling an Islamic worldview among students. Re-
cently, JIM launched Dakutah Digital, an Islamic-oriented computer
program accessible over the Internet. It also formed Kompleks JIM, a
company aiming to integrate aspects of. da'rpah and business, operat-
ing on the philosophy of human welfare through business rather than
being based on traditional profit motives.4e
Hidayatullah
Hidayatullah is the name of the community associated with
Pesantren Hidayatullah, an Islamic learning institution established
by five young Muslim proselytizers: Abdullah Said, Hasan Ibrahim,
lJsman Palase, Hasyim and Nasir Hasan. They pioneered the es-
tablishment of the pesantren in 1,971 in a remote area, Gunung
Tembak, 32 km from Balikpapan, East Kalimantan.In this area
they established an integrated Islamic village as rhe cenrer of their
educational, da'ruah, social and economic activities. Presently,
Hidayatullah has branches in dozens of cities in Indonesia from
Medan in North Sumatra to Palu in Central Sulawesi.
Abdullah Said was the central figure among the Hidayatullah
community. He was the director and manager of the pesantren,
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and actively took part in developing the ideology and direction of
the pesantren. Before becoming engaged in Gunung Tembak,
Abdullah Said had been active in a student org nrzation, PII (The
Association of Indonesian Muslim Students) banned by Soeharto's
regime in 1985. He had studied in various pesantrens like Bangil
and Gontor before he enrolled in university education in
Yogyakarta, however he never completed his college degree. Dur-
ing that time, he was active in various student demonstrations
against Soekarno, organized by KAPPI and KAMI, two pro-
Soeharto student organizations.50
The religious thought and activism of Abdullah Said dominated
the character of Hidayatullah. He was apparently obsessed with
the idea of reviving a "blessed community" based on the Islamic
way of life, with its religious-social and political natures. In his
opinion, in order to build an integrated form of society, Muslims
should find inspiration from the Prophet Muhammad's mission.
He considered this a precondition for the rise of the Muslim
ummalt, or community. The root of Muslim backwardness, he
argued, lies in the lack of understanding of the Shabkdat, the Mus-
lim creed regarding the oneness of God and the apostate of
Muhammad. He insisted that the Sbabddat should be integrated
into Muslim's everyday life. The five phases of the Prophet
Muhammad's life, which consist of the phases of his becoming an
orphan, shepherd, trader, married person, and contemplator in
the cave of Hira, should be imitated in order to revitalize the qual-
ity of the Muslim's Shahkdat.
Centered in Gunung Tembak, Hidayatullah is perceived as a
miniature in which Muslims can go through the five phases. These
five phases are, according to him, reflected in 5 chapters of the
Quran, i.e., al-'Alaq, al-Qalam, al-Muzzammil, al-Muddathir, and
al-Fitihah respectively, which constitute the primary guide and
everyday practice of the Hidayatullah community. For these rea-
sons, he wrote two books entitled respectively, "The Systematic
of Revelation: An Alternative Method Towards the Second Re-
surgence of Islam" and "shahadat: The Prime Capital and'Weapon
Full of Power".51 Hidayatullah is thus assumed to be a reflection
of the method of the Prophet Muhammad' struggle to build the
Muslim community. By imitating the example of the Prophet,
Hidayatullah claims to be able to "serve the need of society, and
offer a therapy and cure their diseases. By so doing, the society
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will find a straight path, full of peace and security".52
Hidayatullah began to flourish in the 1980s when it widened
its wings into the economic, communication, and social fields.
The suppo rt for its expansion came from a grouP of university
students in East Java, particularly those of the Surabaya Institute
of Technology, who opened a branch of the Pesantren Hidayatullah
in Surabaya in L986.In the same year, Hidayatullah started to
publish a monthly journal, Suara HidayatullaE, whose circulation
ieached 35,000 copies. This journal actively raises the issues of the
Muslim world, such as the bloody conflicts in the Middle East,
Afghanistan, and Bosnia. Essays on the Prophet Muhammad and
his companions also consistently constitute the prime pages of
this journal.
In order to advance the independence of its members' the
Hidayatullah community developed an agricultural industry
manned by the students and members of the pes antren Hidayatullah
themselves. In the economic field, the community established
Hudaya, a corporation active in merchandise, production and dis-
tribution. Subsequently the economic expansion of Hidayatullah
involved such services such as transPortation' construction, and
banking. The Sakinah group of companies was established in
Surabaya, which was at the beginning only a small shop selling
everyday needs, but has now become a large company maintain-
ing a number of supermarkets and other retailed business. Besides
that, Hidayatullah established several companies offering trans-
portation services such as CCM Cargo, which provides cargo ser-
vices to many cities in Java, Sumatra and Bali. Intan Travel oper-
ates as a travel agency in several cities in Java, while Intan Tour
provides exclusive travel packets for pilgrimage to Mecca. In the
.onstrrr.tion field, Hidayatullah maintains Citra Cipta Madina
company, which operates not only as a contractor, but also as a
real estate developer. Recently Hidayatullah also initiated the es-
tablishment of Baitul Mal wat Tamwil, Masbraf al-Madina, which
is small-scale Islamic-banking initiative.5'
Darut Taubid
Darut Tauhid is a religious community closely related with
the figure, Abdullah Gymnastiar, born on 29 January 1962'
Abdullah Gymnastiar pioneered the establishment of Darut Tauhid
rn t987 in a location near Bandung, 'West Java, where he began to
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run an entrepreneurial effort within the domain of the Associa-
tion of Entrepreneur Muslim Students. The profit of this pioneer-
ing business was use to supporting da'zuah activities. In line with
the growth of the business, Abdullah Gymnastiar's religious teach-
ings became increasingly popular and attracted hundreds of people
to attend them regularly. Anticipating this growth, the Darut
Tauhid Foundation was established in 1,990.54
Abdullah Gymnastiar enrolled in technical course at
Padjadlaran University, Bandung Institute of Technology, and
Ahmad Yani University, however, being more interested in Is-
lamic knowledge, and he never finished his degree. He claims that
he obtained Islamic knowledge and spiritual guidance from Choer
Affandi, a traditional'klim in Garut, \West Java. His powerful ora-
tory style made Abdullah Gymnastiar quite popular, particularly
among university students. In daily life, he often wears a long white
shirt, sarong and turban 
-a style that become rhe norm withinthe Darut Tauhid complex, which is inhibited by hundreds of
permanent members and thousands of non-permanent ones.
The basic doctrine of Darut Tauhid includes zikir (confession
of farth), fi&lr (thinking), and ikbtiyar (free choice). Among Darut
Tauhid members, zikr is the primary principle on which Muslims
should rely, in the sense that God is the only focus and rarget in
Muslim activities. \flhatever happens, the Muslim belief in God
will never be eliminated. Zikr developed by Abdullah Gymnastiar,
according to his own explanation, derives from the zikr created
by Hassan al-Banna, the prominent Ikhwanul Muslimin figure.55
Gymnastiar, however, argues that zikr alone is not enough; Mus-
lims should also think and optimize their ability to think in order
to find the truth. By thinking, Muslims can come to rhe proper
and strategic way to overcome various challenges confronting the
wmmah. Free choice is then intended to optimize Muslim initia-
tives and efforts to compete in a challenging era. Zikr, fikr, and
ikbtiyar are thus the three key principles that should be taken
into account by all members of Darut Tauhid's community.
Darut Tauhid claims that its primary mission is to facilitare rhe
development of Islamic educational, economic, social, and cultural
activities. It aspires to become a miniature of society where Is-
lamic teachings can be practiced and its benefits can be felt by the
Muslim ummah. By so doing, Darut Tauhid believes that it can
exhibit the beauty of Islamic teaching, Islamic ethos, Islamic man-
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agement, Islamic professionalism, and, above all, Islamic solutions
for various problems facing Muslims. Moreover, Darut Tauhid
has become a model demonstrating how Islamic activities can be
enriched by education, training, management, arts and culture,
economy and technology initiatives.5'
Darut Tauhid declares that its mission is to fill the 'spiritual
void' of the urban masses by developing Islamic activities that will
affect peopie in their daily lives. This method is called by Darut
Tauhid as "Manajemen Qalbu" (the management of heart). The
basic notion is to manage and maintain purity of heart in the way
of knowing God. Darut Tauhid believes that spiritual values such
as patience, generosity, resignation and honesty, once nurtured,
wiil pour out of peoples' hearts. The organizauon asserts that this
method wiil be able to meet many societal needs, and at the same
time offer Islam as an alternative to answer various contemporary
problems.
In order to respond to Muslims needs regarding their prepared-
ness to face the challenges of the present age, Darut Tauhid intro-
duced various forms of psychological training, such as Achieve-
ment Motivation Training, Outward Bound Training, Team Build-
ing Training, and also F{eart Management Training. As in mili-
tary training camps, Darut Tauhid members often undertake
mountain climbing training and other challenges in order to
toughen them mentally. Moreover, Darut Tauhid is very much
concerned with the problems of morality, particularly being aware
of the impact of drugs on the young Muslim generation. In re-
sponse to this concern, Darut Tauhid opened a rehabilitation cen-
ter for drug victims. Its concern with morality has even stimu-
lated Darut Tauhid to mobilize thousands of people outfitting them
with black uniforms and providing them with accessories resem-
bling those used by military troops named Santri Serba Guna,
"Multiple-purposes Muslim Students", in order to attack gambling
centers in Bandung.5t
Since the early 1990s, the growth of Darut Tauhid's center has
taken place rapidly. Starting in a rented house with 20 rooms, the
organrzation moved to a permanent building with 3 floors in 1993.
From this new building the economic activities of Darut Tauhid
community began to develop and gradually expanded into such
fields as garment production, supermarket, publishing, and Islamic
banking. Since 1997, the area of Gegerkalong has changed to be-
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come a Darut Tauhid village; full of Islamic symbols, including an
Islamic cottage named Darul Jannah, The House of Paradise, which
offers a sort of spiritual vacation for executives.
The acceleration of the development of Darut Tauhid is appar-
ently a function of the support oi 
" 
.rumber of rich professionals
from Jakarta and Bandung who have becbme dedicated members
of the organization. Of five advisory board members, four are en-
gineers and one of them is chief president of Astra International-
one of Indonesia's giant conglomerates, and president commis-
sioner of several other large companies. Darut Tauhid itself has a
number of economic joint venture counterparts, such as Astra
Mitra Ventura, Bumi Daya Bank, Dharma Bhakti Astra Founda-
tion, Indomacro Adi Prima, Train Public Company, Smart Cor-
poration, Anugrah Pharmindo, Maspion, Prasetya Mulya and Post
Indonesia. The names behind these companies are commonly con-
glomerates that play a crucial part in the Indonesian economy.
The economic activities of Darut Tauhid are divided into four
main divisions: merchandise, manufacturing, public service, and
information management systems. The merchandise division in-
cludes such units as supermarket supplies, basic commodities, and
electronics. Under the division of manufacturing there are Islamic
handicraft units, garment, and cassette recording, which has pro-
duced dozens of Abdullah Gymnastiar's da'utah speeches and song
recordings. The public service division has a mini Islamic bank,
sound system maintenance, and communication shop. The divi-
sion of information management systems deals with software, MIS
& networking, advertising and production. For these purposes,
Darut Tauhid has even announced that economic development is
the primary pillar of devotion to God. According to the laresr
data, Darut Tauhid's economic assets have reached eight billion
Indonesian Rupiah.tt
Jamaah Al-Turath al-Islami
The religious communrty of Al-Turath al-Islami was pioneered
in 1987 by a group of young people led by Abu Nida, who initi-
ated a small religious teaching program in the area around Gadjah
Mada University and the Teachers' Training College in
Yogyakarta. Their religious teachings gradually evolved and at-
tracted a number of followers, particularly university students. In
1994,rhey decided to establish a foundation called'Majlis al-Turath
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al-Islami', with which the religious teachings and their followers
are associated.se
Abu Nida is a highly central figure in Al-Turath al-Islami. He
is not only the foundin gfather of this movement, but also its leader
up to the present day. His original name is Chamsaha Shofwan,
and he was born in East Java on 7 July 1954. Abu Nida studied at
Pesantren Karangasem, through which he made contact with DDII
(Dewan Dakraah Islam Indonesia),Islamic Missionary Council of
Indonesia, which is led by a number of former Masyumi leaders.
He was one of the proselytizers sent by DDII to \7est Kalimantan
in its program to disseminate Islam among isolated tribes there.
Via DDII, Abu Nida went to Saudi Arabia to study at Imam
Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud University. After finishing his undergradu-
ate degree, he did not go back directly to Indonesia but went to
A{ghanistan to join the Mujahidin troops. Back in Indonesia, he
was asked to teach in several pesantrens including "Al-Mukmin",
Ngruki, Solo, Central Java, and "Ibnul Qayyim", Sleman,
Yogyakarta, before he established the Al-Turath al-Islami com-
munity.6o
The Al-Turath al-Islami calls itself a puritan movement, since
it believes that Muslims nowadays have abandoned the understand-
ing of Islam and Islamic values taught by the early-dedicated gen-
eration, Salaf al-&lih. According to them, this abandonment has
brought about the collapse of the glory of Islam. The movement
is worried about the emergence of heretical teachings, split groups,
and misleading fatwas issued by incompetent Persons' which, in
their belief, should be challenged by revitalizing the puritan way,
manhaj salafi.ab, claimed as an infallible way, free from deviation,
solely based on the Quran and the Sunna. The movement believes
that the early-dedicated Muslims were the best generation pro-
duced by Islam.6t A prominent factor that encouraged Abu Nida
to establish the movement derives from his observation that many
young Muslims have been exposed to the negative effects of mod-
ernization, since they do not have adequate knowledge of Islam.
This problem is aggravated by the inability of existing Muslim
org nLzations to deal with the problems of the ummah.62
The initiative of Abu Nida to establish At-Turath al-Islami was
greeted by his friends who also studied in Saudi Arabia with en-
thusiasm. Ahmad Fais, Rofik, Asmuji and Hambali fleetly joined
Abu Nida. More support came from Gadjah Mada University stu-
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dents, most of who were Jamaah Shalahuddin63 members, a mls-
sionary group associated with Gadjah Mada University. Abu Nida's
access to Jamaah Shalahuddin was provided by DDII Yogyakarta,
which had good relations with Jamaah Shalahuddin. The students
who joined Al-Turath al-Islami mostly come from a technical back-
ground, particularly from schools of medicine, forestry, engineer-
ing, mathematics and natural science faculties. Subsequently, many
university graduates who have earned the title of engineer are in-
volved in this movement.64
At the beginning, the activities of Al-Turath al-Islami were still
integrated with those of other movements such as Indonesian
Ikhwanul Muslimin,65 and NII, the Islamic State of Indonesia.66
Their activities llke daurah, a type of workshop, were full of po-
litical flavor. The group quickly expanded its influence not only
throughout Java but also in other islands like Sumatra and
Kalimantan. The intimacy of Al-Turath al-Islami with Ikhwanul
Muslimin was not sustained, however, because of the strong de-
sire of the latter to be involved in political Islam. However, the
loss of Ikhwanul Muslimin was quickly replaced by Ja'far lJmar
Thalib, who later established the Ihya al-sunnah community,6T 
-
the backbone of the Laskar Jibad group currently fighting in
Maluku.68
The movement of Al-Turath al-Islami chose \Tirokerten, a vil-
lage a few kilometers to the south of Yogyakarta, as its center. In
this village Al-Turath al-Islami bought a tract of land, some t ha,
on which a mosque, Islamic boarding school and the housing of
its teachers and proponents were subsequently built. At the be-
ginning, the presence of the movement was suspected by locals
and nearly evicted, but it survives up to the present day. Thanks
to the support of the government of Kuwait, an Islamic center
associated with al-Turath al-Islami was also established, in an area
not far from 'Wirokerten. According to Abu Nida, this Islamic
center is to be used as an educational center for elementary to
advanced levels within the Islamic boarding school system.6e In
'$(irokerten, the presence of Al-Turath al-Islami community is
f.airly remarkable. Its members can easily be distinguished from
their pattern of dress and male-female relations. Besides allowing
their beards to grow long, male members wear long shirts, trou-
sers above ankle and white hats, while female members wear long
black dresses and cover their faces with veils. The female mem-
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bers are secluded from the men, and are only allowed to make
contact with male members with the presence of their husbands
or muhrims. Their space in social interaction is highly restricted.
The community adamantly condemns what they call ikhtil|t the
mixing of males and females in one place without any clear bound-
ary.to Therefore, they are perceived and labeled by people outside
their group as an exclusive and fanatic community.
Besides deveioping learning centers, the Al-Turath al-Islami
community has attempted to open a number of entrepreneur ser-
vices such as motorcycle and auto repair shops, computer, agri-
culture, and home industries, though there has been only limited
success as of yet. The movernent has been publishing da'zaah mag '
zines and bulletins, produced'Islamic cassettes', established a mini
Islamic bank, and opened a mini-market.il Some of the movement's
activities are apparently supported by outside funding institutions,
particularly from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The existence of this
movement is even pardy determined by such financial supports.T2
Paramad.ina and, Tazkiya Sejati
Recently, there has been a new trend in Indonesian Islam. Many
executives and upper middle class people have become interested
in sufism, which has gradually become a new symbol of elitism.
This trend appeared toward the end of 1980s, but has become more
clearly articulated in the last few years, particularly after the erup-
tion of the economic crisis in Indonesiain 1997. Nowadays, it is
common to find sufi religious teachings being held at starred ho-
tel and other luxurious venues in such cities as Jakarta, Bandung
and Surabaya, where executives and members of the upper middle
class engage in reciting the Quran, chanting dhikr, and the likes.
The coming of this new trend seems to be related to the presence
of Paramadina and Tazkiya Sejati, two urban Muslim elite move-
ments that have launched programs of understanding and practic-
ing sufism, which are quite popular with executives.
Paramadina was established by a number of progressive Mus-
lim intellectuals in collaboration with Muslim entrepreneurs who
mostly came from HMI, a Muslim student organization that gen-
erated a number of outstanding figures in various arenas within
the Indonesian nation-state. Some prominent Muslim leaders such
as Nurcholish Madyid, Dawam Rahardjo, lJtomo Dananjaya,
Abdul Latief and Fahmi Idris, the last two being successful entre-
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preneurs, constitute the locomotive of Paramadina that has evolved
into an urban-elite religious institution. Paramadina was founded
in anticipation of a boom in the ranks of the educated Muslim
middle-class, a phenomenon that contributed to the generation of
substantial numbers of Muslim intellectuals. Through Paramadina,
Indonesian Muslims have had an avenue to conduct dialogue and
produce creative and innovative ways in which to build their un-
derstanding of their religion.T3
As a religious movement, Paramadina embodies three primary
characteristics: independence, openness, and cultural orientation.
Independence means that the organization has no single political
alliance by which it is dominated. In regards to its commitment to
openness, Paramadina maintains that its members can receive in-
spiration from any source. This open character goes hand in hand
with the cultural orientation upheld by Paramadina, in the sense
that it is a movement that is not inclined to politics, but rather
asserts Islam as a cultural power that can provide alternatives and
answers to contemporary challenges, without falling into the trap
of exclusivity.
Paramadina maintains an approach that can be characterized as
nationalistic-Islamic. It promotes Islamic revivalism within the
context of Indonesia where Islam has been accepted and practiced
broadly as a primary source for building common values. Islam is
thus presented as a main source of Indonesian values, yet also as a
culturally productive force that can aid the development of con-
structive alternatives for the nation. The unity of Islamic and In-
donesian values is the hallmark of Paramadina. Islam, as a cultural
and national force, is hoped to become an alternative for the grow-
ing numbers of people that are experiencing difficulties amidst
the often alienating processes of development and globalization.Ta
In order to realize these aims, Paramadina created a number of
Islamic learning programs specifically designed for executives, pro-
fessionals, practitioners, functionaries and other middle class pro-
fessionals. It also provides pure Islamic studies and research aim-
ing to develop sciences and Islamic understanding. "Paramadina
Eksekutif", which emphasizes sufism, is one of the organization's
primary programs belonging to the first category. Such a program
offers 'sufism packets' which consist of a dozen gatherings. In these
sessions, executives can be active in chanting dbikr, without being
involved in certain sufi orders-although they do spend signifi-
Studiz Islamika, Vol. 7, No. 3, ?000
Noorhaidi Haan
cant amount of money for the service.
Paramadina is not the only movement that handles this type of
urban-elite religious teachings. Tazkrya Sejati, led by Jalaluddin
Rakhmat, also works in the same field. It has an office based in
Patra Kuni ngar^, 
^n 
elite area of Jakarta. This group and its well-
known leader are closely associated with the Muthahhari Foun-
dation, which espouses the theme "For the enlightenment of Is-
lamic thought". Like Paramadina, the success of Tazkiya Sejati is
pariy determined by the suPPort of some prominent business-
men and executives such as Tantyo P. Sudharmono, the son of the
former vice-President of Indonesia, Sudharmono' and Haidar Bagir,
a Muslim businessman who has long advocated Sht'a to Indone-
sian Muslims.
In Search of Identity and the Public Sphere
Many contemporary Islamic communities are first and fore-
most social movements that are ultimately directed towards the
realizatton of an authentically Muslim community, the ummalt,
which is often defined as the community that resembles the early
generation of Muslims. This direction rePresents the search for
authenticity, which conveys puritanical ideals. Such a search might
appear in manifold expressions, ranging from the revitalization of
tlre lost glory of Islam to the construction of an Islamic space of
life. Yet, there is a common view that Islam is to be recalled in
order to face the increasingly present challenges.
The quest for authenticity is normally associated with a crisis
of identity, which represents a source of meaning for social ac-
tors. Identity organ:zes meaning, in the v/ay that the purpose of
certain actions is symbolically identified.T5 In the so-called net-
work society, the search for meaning is normally organized around
a primary identity, which is self-sustaining across time and space.
\X/ithin this context, religion often takes part in organizing the
meaning and appears to be strong and influential as a source of
identity.
There are two themes recurring in the contemPorary Islamic
movements that I deal with: "Muslim backwardness caused by in-
ternal weaknesses", and the quest "to form a progressive and dy-
namic Muslim society". These two themes clearly represent two
different, but related, tendencies. The theme of Muslim backward-
ness is more remarkably related to marginality, and thus connected
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with the deprived situations of urban masses. Movements advo-
cating this theme often represent resistance against marginality.
The appearing expressions and languages among the communities
of Darul Arqam, Al-Turath al-Islami, Hidayatullah, and Darut
Tauhid, with different nuances, exhibit most strikingly the voices
of marginality.
The Darul Arqam came into being in 1968, not long before the
upheaval of the racial Malay-Chinese riots in 1969. At that time,
the dominance of UMNO was unquestionable' as the superiority
of Chinese in the economy brought jealousy to a boil. Such a po-
litico-economic situation was not so different from that of Indo-
nesia during nearly the entire length of Soeharto's presidency. In
the case of Indonesia, the position of the single-majority was in
the hand of Golkar, the giant ruling party that was prepared to
swallow all Muslim political powers. At the same time, Indone-
sian-Chinese businesspersons, being aware that the economy was
the only avenue that they could employ to negotiate Power' suc-
ceeded in controlling more than three-quarter of the Indonesian
economy. The emergence of Hidayatullah at the beginning of the
1970s signifies the withdrawal of Muslims from the political arena,
although also the beginning of gradual attempts to seek comPen-
sation for marginalization through the development of economic
power. For a long period, Muslims did not have any significant
power tsis)-pis the state, which continuously imposed its webs of
power on all spaces within civil society. This resulted in the frus-
tration of Indonesian Muslims in regards to the obstruction of
Muslim political expression, which reached a culmination when
Soeharto's regime imposed Pancasila as the sole foundation for
all-social or ganizations and political parties.T6 Al-Turath al-Islami
and Darut Tauhid, which emerged in the late 1980s, strikingly
exhibit this frustration, though the latter attempted to compen-
sate its frustration by building economic Power.
On the other hand, JIM, Paramadina andTazktya Sejati, which
were established in the 1990s, represent a different mainstream.
They place more emphasis on forming a progressive and dynamic
Muslim society that is able to face contemporary issues. They show
to some extent the belief in and hope for the ability of Muslim
society to deal with current challenges. The emergence of these
movements is as closely related to the political transformation of
both Malaysia and Indonesia, which increasingly demonstrated
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their accommodation of Muslims. as to the shift of Muslims them-
selves into a more accommodative position vis-)-vis the states.
\Tithin the framework of analysis provided by Castells, the first
tendency related to marginality might be categorized as a type of
resistance identity. This is normally "generated by those actors
that are in position devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of
domination". This tendency is distinguished from the second ten-
dency, the project identity, which appears "when social actors build
a new identity that redefines their position in society and, by do-
ing so, seek the transformation of overall social structure".77
Vithin the context marked by power relationships, an attempt
to distinguish these two different tendencies is highly important.
In general, marginality seems to be generated by authoritarian
political regimes, which for reasons of economic progress or po-
litical stability tend not to allow any different opinions to appear,
and bring everything into their very strict political controls. As a
result, a movement that appears out of this marginality is inclined
to proclaim commitment to a revolutionary and absolutist ideol-
ogy, so that its political nature is more remarkable. However, if a
political regime exhibits accommodation, albeit at a symbolical
level, such a tendency shifts into a collaborative stance requiring
participation in the existing secular-political institutions, its po-
litical nature then, at least for a while, is brought aside. It is im-
portant to note that this outline is not to be applied in a sweeping
manner.
As mentioned earlier, the crisis of identity cannot be disassoci-
ated from rapid social change and globalization.'S7hen the mod-
ernizing projects succeeded, they on the one hand, generated ur-
ban masses and middle class, and on the other hand, introduced
secularization and new forms of communicative knowledge. All
of these effects of modernization inevitably brought about the loss
of meaning for certain segments of society- economically, socio-
culturally, and politically. Economically, there are many people
who have lost their jobs or are threatened with unemployment.
This threat is particularly felt by those whose hopes have been
inflated by the promises of development voiced by the govern-
ment. There are those who have enrolled in university education
or taken part in other higher educational institutions. Socially,
the collapse of community and traditional society certainly com-
pels people to find new meaning, in line with the loss of the role
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of social actors in the community, simply because there is no longer
community in its traditional meaning. The hardest struck are the
key players in the traditional hierarchy of the community like
the ulama, whose powers have been disrupted by the processes of
modernization. Culturally, many people are not prepared to face
the expansion of the modern and global culture, which make them
feel shocked and frustrated. Politically, due to modernization,
spaces for participation in the political arena are reduced, but at
the same time, the modern nation-states fail to accomplish the
promises of modernization. In short, there are those who are ex-
cluded in the currents of modernization and globalization.
On.the other hand, the development of the new Muslim middle
class brought its own consequences. Those involved in business
activities or absorbed in big modern companies often could not
separate themselves from business games and the interests of capi-
talists. Those who worked as academicians in universities could
often not apply the principle of academic freedom, nor depend on
their limited incomes for adequate sustenance. Meanwhile profes-
sionals like lawyers, journalists and other practitioners could not
be totally independent and needed to obey the various restric-
tions and regulations made by the regime.78 Another consequence
is that when the new Muslim middle class took over the initiative
to direct Muslim societal discourse, the traditional hierarchy that
centered on ularna could no longer monopolize religious discourse.
More and more people from different backgrounds became in-
volved in discussing religious matters bringing in a variety of
sources of knowledge and various interpretations of truth. As a
result, anxiety and worry started to appear among those who were
marginalized within the process of social mobilization.
\flithin the majority of the movements that I examine, the pres-
ence of key actors in defining and organizing meaning within the
movements is highly important. \Tithout them, the movements
might not have come into existence. Ashari Muhammad, Abdullah
Said, Abu Nida, and Abdullah Gymnastiar played pivotal roles in
the construction of their own movements and the meanings by
which they are animated. \7ith formulations that are occasionally
messianic in nature, the hopes to become the best ummalt, whereby
Islamic glory will be revived, were demonstrated clearly by Ashari
Muhammad and others. Such a hope was also present in the rheto-
ric of Abdullah Said. who emphasized the revitalization of Islam
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through the practice of returning back to the model of the prophet
Muhammad in propagating Islam. The same thing was highlighted
by Abu Nida, who saw the need for revitalizing the example of
Salaf al-SAlih, the early dedicated generation. A more accommo-
dating hope came from Darut Tauhid, which, despite being con-
scious of the fact that many Muslims are in a weak position facing
modern challenges, offered a new model of Islamic society.
The actors of those movements constructed a new meaning
within the boundaries of new communality created to challenge
the existing order. There is a similarity of rhetoric between Darul
Arqam, Al-Turath al-Islami, Hidayatullah, and Darut Tauhid, that
an Islamic space is to be created by imitating the foundation of
the early Muslim community built by the prophet Muhammad,
although the last two more clearly exhibit their accommodation
of the existing order. Sungai Penchala, Gunung Tembak,
Gegerkalong Girang, and'Wirokerten are conceived to be Islamic
villages, within which people who are not associated with them
are excluded. This is the tendency called by Castells "the exclu-
sion of the excluders by the excluded".Te By so doing, they can
freely define new meanings, whereby identity can be regained.
Since economic disadvantage is an important factor in the loss
of identity, movements that advocate resistance identity attempt
to regain economic power. This was highly significant within the
communities of Darul Arqam, Hidayatullah, Darut Tauhid, and
Al-Turath al-Islami. Success in achieving economic power has been
demonstrated by, at least, the first three movements, which have
been able to organize various economic enterprises on a large scale.
This achievement reminds us of \7eber, who suggested that reli-
gious beliefs are directly related to economic conduct. This thesis
arose from his observation of the economic progress of Europe in
the hands of the bourgeois during the rise of the puritanical ide-
als. Based on this observation, he came to the conclusion that the
puritanical ideals advocated by Protestantism contributed to
progress.8o The presence of the puritanical ideals in these move-
ments seemingly corresponds to the emergence of new networks
of trust relationships among movement actors. The widespread
relationships of trust provide the basis for the development of in-
formal communication networks, interaction, and mutual support
needed to expand various enterprises.
The presence of people within the movements who enjoyed
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the results of modernity, particularly the uPPer middle class of
technocrats and professionals, sheds light on the significance of
communality. Economic success, without being balanced by the
warmth of communality, does not seem to be entirely fulfilling
for many in capitalist-urban society that has individualized indi-
viduals. The absence of social roles for the upper middle class, as
opposed to simply economic roles, constitutes one reason for them
to seek a primary identity. The level of ones economic welfare
can increase dramatically, but it does not necessary provide psy-
chological welfare.
One remarkable feature of these movements is that sufism nor-
mally constitutes an important component. Both the movements
that uphold resistance identity or of project identity did not flour-
ish without the presence of sufism, which is often represented by
the internalization of certain dhikrs. As a ritual comPonent, dhikr
plays an important role in the production of identities. It repre-
sents forms of symbolic expression whereby communications con-
cerning social relationships are passed on, in stylized and drama-
tized ways. Through this ritual, power identity and collective feel-
ings of belonging are reinforced.8l \(/ithin these movements' sufism
is related very much to puritanical notions: a consciousness that
the purity of Muslims has been stained, and so requires purifica-
don. Dhikr constitutes the way to perform the purification. Dif-
ferent from a common assumption that sufism cannot necessarily
go hand in hand with puritanism, this fact implies otherwise.
Another explanation is that sufism can provide a cooling mantle
for the economically marginalized as well as the disaffected middle
class within a communal or quasi-communal life.
It is worth noting that the communication media contributes
to the proliferation of these movements. Cassettes and videos con-
taining da'zaah messages of the key figures of the movements con-
stitute one of the ways they attract new members. Recently, these
channels have been supported by the use of cyberspace media of
communication. The use of the new media enables these move-
ments to involve more people from different backgrounds and
various levels of religious competence to ParticiPate in discussing
and revitalizing various religious discourses. This transformation
creates a public sphere in which wider Portions of Muslim society
can participate in the discussions about Islamic values and prac-
tices.82 Through new media, educated people who are not reli-
Studiz kkmika, VoL 7, No. 3,2000
Noorbaidi Hrean
gious scholars can increasingly contribute to the discussion of le-
gal issues and create alternative sites for religious discourse and
rePresentation.
Finally, these facts highlight the development of civil society
in the Muslim world as reflected by the proliferation of contem-
porary Islamic movements. Their presence can be paralleled with
the spread of autonomous civil associations, which encourages the
development of democracy. Such associations can be a means for
Muslims at large both to achieve common PurPoses and to main-
tain their independence of government. They also provide oPPor-
tunities for contesting and debating the legitimacy of the system,
the elite running the system, and the operation of the system it-
self.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to show the phenomenon of contem-
porary Islamic movements within the context of the development
of civil society in Indonesia and Malaysia, the two largest Muslim
countries in Southeast Asia. These movements exhibit three sig-
nificant features: (1) they commonly express hopes for the realiza-
tion of an authentically Muslim society-an objective relating to
puritanical ideals, (2) within these movements, puritanical ideals
go hand in hand with the practice of sufism, which constitute an
important relationship-building element suPPorting the achieve-
ment of communal goals, and (3) since the search for authenticity
is often challenged by the national-secular nation-state Power, frus-
tration with the existing world order occasionally spawns the erup-
tion of revolutionary political activity.
The movements imply a site of resistance from within civil so-
ciety, as they represent an attempt to make disenfranchised voices
heard above the currents of social change that has left some seg-
ments of society marginalized. The process of marginalization has
inevitably resulted in the loss of meaning networks in social rela-
tions. Such movements attempt to restore a primary identity for
marginalized social actors and provide new meaning and a new
interpretation of their world.
One striking fact is that contempor^ry Islamic movements are
foremost a phenomenon of urban life, which directly experiences
the impacts of modernization and globalization. Different from
rural life where communaliry still exists, life in urban-modern envi-
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ronments often obstructs the communality that was formerly
an important source of identity. When contemporary Islamic
movements emerged to offer the warmth of communality, assisted
by the practice of sufism, many of the urban masses and new middle
class were attracted. Vithin the boundaries of communality, the
common goals advanced by contemporary Islamic movements
could be struggled for and maintained.
The political context within which contemporary Islamic move-
ments emerged also demonstrates the correlation between chang-
ing political forms and the way in which contemporary Islamic
movements exhibit themselves. This explains the relevance of
contemporary.Islamic movements within the development of civil
society in the area under discussion. These developments consti-
tute a sign of the growth of democracy, following the develop-
ment of economy and social welfare, as an inevitable-impact of
the state's policy to accelerate economic welfare in order to main-
tain control over the society.
The explanation and analysis of the responses of these move-
ments towards sociopolitical change, particularly along with the
tensions between the state and religion in the area under discus-
sion, are crucial in understanding the dynamics of Islam and mo-
dernity. The dynamics demonstrate parallel moves between Islam
and modernity, though the way of the former to react often uses
different expressions and sentiments. If this is accepted, it can be
used as a starting-point to re-examine comprehensively the thesis
arising from the European Enlightenment that religion does not
necessarily go hand in hand with modernity.
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